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Abstract 
This study investigates the origins of variation in the structures of interorganizational networks 
across industries. We combine empirical analyses of existing interorganizational networks with an 
agent-based simulation model of network emergence. Our insights are twofold. First, we find that 
differences in technological dynamism across industries and the concomitant demands for value 
creation engender variations in firms’ collaborative behaviors. On average, firms in technologically 
dynamic industries pursue more open ego networks, which fosters access to new and diverse 
resources that help sustain continuous innovation. In contrast, firms in technologically stable 
industries on average pursue more closed ego networks, which fosters reliable collaboration and 
helps preserve existing resources. Second, we show that because of the observed cross-industry 
differences in firms’ collaborative behaviors, the emergent industry-wide networks take on distinct 
structural forms. Technologically stable industries feature clan networks, characterized by low network 
connectedness and rather strong community structures. Technologically dynamic industries, in turn, 
feature community networks, characterized by high network connectedness and medium-to-strong 
community structures. Convention networks, which feature high network connectedness and weak 
community structures, were not evident among the empirical networks we examined. Taken 
together, our findings advance an environmental contingency theory of network formation.
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INTRODUCTION 
Studies investigating how social structure shapes the behaviors and outcomes of actors constitute a 
vibrant area of organizational research. Prior work on the social structures of corporate actors has 
indicated that the structure of an interorganizational network helps explain a range of collective 
outcomes of organizations, such as diffusion of norms, knowledge, or other resources (Rogers, 2003; 
Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). Furthermore, recent studies suggest that networks in different 
interorganizational settings often show distinct structural properties. For example, studies of 
partnership networks among firms demonstrate that industry-wide structures of these networks 
differ across industries on a number of important dimensions (Rosenkopf and Schilling, 2007). Yet, 
despite mounting evidence that the variations in industry-wide networks may help explain firms' 
collective outcomes, there are limited insights regarding why interorganizational networks vary across 
different industrial contexts. Without a systematic understanding of the antecedents of variation in 
industry-wide network structures, it may be difficult to link the properties of these networks to the 
collective outcomes they engender for firms.  
The present paper examines networks of technology partnerships among firms and explores 
why their structural properties differ across industries. Industry-wide networks represent the 
interlinked structure of firms’ ego networks (i.e. ego and its direct contacts, as well as the 
connections among those contacts) and thus capture the overall system of firms and their ties in a 
given industry. Networks of technology partnerships are critical for the transfer of knowledge and 
resources among organizations, and they have been shown to affect a range of private and collective 
organizational outcomes (e.g., Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). In developing our theory, we build on 
the basic property of complex social systems, whereby the emergence of distinct network forms can 
be traced to individual actors’ collaborative behaviors (Coleman, 1990). Networks of technology 
partnerships constitute a highly dynamic setting in which firms constantly reshape their ties due to 
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the economic imperatives of value creation. These dynamics are highly consequential for the 
structures of the emergent industry-wide networks (Powell, White, Koput, and Owen-Smith, 2005).  
We seek to advance existing theory by exploring whether and to what extent variations in 
firms’ collaborative behaviors across industries help explain the variation in industry-wide networks. 
We thus aim to understand why and how firms’ collaborative behaviors differ across industries and 
whether these differences sufficiently explain the emergence of distinct industry-wide networks. We 
accomplish these interrelated goals by conducting two studies. In the first study, we examine whether 
the differences in demands for value creation lead to a significant variation in the collaborative 
behaviors of firms across industries. Although a range of behaviors can characterize the formation of 
interorganizational systems, we focus on those behaviors that have received particular attention in 
the past. Specifically, we study how firms pursue either closed or open ego networks. Pursuing a 
closed ego network entails forming ties to partners that are connected to one another; in turn, 
pursuing an open ego network involves forming ties to partners that are not connected (Burt, 2012). 
Building on prior findings on the contribution of open and closed ego networks to firm 
advantage across different industrial contexts (Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt, 2000), our first 
study postulates that firms’ collaborative behaviors are associated with the requirements of value 
creation imposed by the technological regime of an industry. In particular, we focus on an industry’s 
technological dynamism, which reflects the extent to which resident firms emphasize investments in 
research and development (R&D) (Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 2001). We posit that in 
technologically dynamic industries, firms are first and foremost driven to pursue more diverse 
resources and knowledge as critical inputs to innovation, and that doing so is best enabled by open 
ego network structures. In contrast, in technologically stable industries firms are driven to preserve 
their existing resources and ensure reliable cooperation, which are best enabled by closed ego 
network structures. We therefore anticipate that, on average, firms in technologically dynamic 
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industries will display stronger tendencies toward open ego networks than those in technologically 
stable industries. We test these arguments using a longitudinal dataset on the formation of interfirm 
R&D partnerships in several industries from 1983 to 1999. Our dataset covers a wide range of 
industrial environments characterized by a varying emphasis on R&D, including the automotive 
industry, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, chemicals, microelectronics, new materials, and 
telecommunications. 
In the second study, we proceed to examine whether the variation in firm-level behaviors is 
sufficient to explain the structural differences in industry-wide networks. To do so, we construct an 
agent-based model of network emergence. The model operates under the conditions of varying 
technological dynamism across different industrial contexts. This feature helps us determine whether, 
in the presence of other forces driving interfirm ties, the variation in firms’ collaborative behaviors 
along the continuum of closed to open ego networks explains the emergence of distinct global 
network properties. The agent-based model positions us to better address the aggregate complexity 
of firms’ interactions, which may be complicated by varying collaborative preferences of firms as well 
as by possible exogenous perturbations. This approach is particularly fruitful because industry-wide 
networks represent highly dynamic systems; indeed, they are shaped by interactions among multiple 
firms and exhibit aggregate properties that cannot be predicted from the behaviors of individual 
firms. Moreover, the processes by which these networks form may be nonlinear, thus obscuring the 
link between micro-level behaviors and macro-level structures (Skvoretz, 2002; Davis, Eisenhardt, 
and Bingham, 2009). In addition, this approach allows us to capture the overall variation in network 
forms by offering a general typology of interorganizational systems in relation to their environment. 
Jointly, our two studies represent a key step toward an environmental contingency theory of 
network formation. This theory proposes a close association between the characteristics of actors' 
external environment—including its technological regime and associated institutionalized practices 
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and norms—and the processes of network formation. We expect that these features of actors’ 
external environment and the collaborative behaviors they induce are among the main drivers of 
variation in network structures observed across different social and economic environments. 
STUDY 1: TECHNOLOGICAL DYNAMISM AND THE FORMATION OF 
INTERORGANIZATIONAL TIES  
A key insight from prior studies of complex social systems is that interactions among individual 
actors as they form new network ties are critical in shaping the properties of the emergent social 
system (Coleman, 1990). This general insight implies that depending on how individual firms form 
their collaborative ties with partners, different industry-wide network forms may emerge. Admittedly, 
in forming new partnership ties firms may exhibit a range of behaviors. Yet, recent research indicates 
that one of the central differentiators is the extent to which firms pursue either more closed or more 
open ego networks (Li and Rowley, 2002; Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008; Ahuja, Polidoro, and 
Mitchell, 2009; Sytch, Tatarynowicz, and Gulati, 2012). A closed ego network occurs when a firm 
forms ties to the partners of its current partners, while an open ego network occurs when a firm 
form ties to alters that are unconnected to its current partners.  
A particularly intriguing insight into the formation of closed and open ego networks is that 
they may be driven by fundamentally different strategic motivations on the part of firms. Pursuing 
closed ego networks has been linked to ensuring reliable collaboration and preserving existing 
resources. Because information on other firms is distributed imperfectly and the costs of partner 
search and selection are high, firms often prefer to connect to alters on whom they can obtain 
private information through shared third-party ties (Gulati, 1995). Furthermore, having a third party 
in common begets a situation where the two partners do not necessarily bear the full costs of the 
partnership. In particular, a common third party may offer effective recourse in conflict situations 
and protection against opportunistic pursuits (Larson, 1992). Finally, by enabling quick diffusion of 
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reputational insights, closed ego networks can make it costly for partners to engage in self-seeking 
behaviors to the detriment of the focal firm (Greif, 1989; Ahuja, 2000). These features of closed ego 
networks can make them particularly effective in ensuring reliable collaboration and minimizing the 
transaction costs of partnering.   
In contrast, the central motivation for pursuing open ego networks is that such structures 
enable more entrepreneurial firms to acquire diverse information, knowledge, and resources (Burt, 
1992). Alters that are not connected to one another are believed to represent distinct network 
regions with diverse technical knowledge and information endowments (Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 
2014a). Firms' innovation activities often entail recombining existing knowledge elements 
(Schumpeter, 1934), and open networks can enable firms to leverage such diversity to pursue 
superior innovation outcomes. This benefit—access to diverse information—is largely unavailable to 
firms in closed ego networks. This is because ties between similar firms (Powell et al., 2005; Ahuja et 
al., 2009) and the loss of diversity due to increased knowledge and information sharing among 
densely interconnected firms (Lazer and Friedman, 2007; Gulati, Sytch, and Tatarynowicz, 2012) 
typically result in greater homogeneity of the available knowledge and information. 
Given the fundamental tradeoff between the benefits and costs of closed and open ego 
networks, we expect that firms’ collaborative behaviors may vary depending on the environmental 
requirements for value creation. Specifically, it is possible that slow-paced and technologically stable 
industrial settings in which firms focus on the preservation and incremental growth of the existing 
resource base will tend to engender more closed ego networks. In such industries, closed ego 
networks may help ensure collaborative continuity via high levels of trust and reputational lock-ins, 
both of which can help firms preserve their existing resources. In contrast, firms in technologically 
dynamic industries may lean toward more open ego networks where opportunities to leverage 
heterogeneous knowledge from diverse partners may outweigh the benefits of resource preservation. 
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This argument builds in part on the work of Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt (2000) who showed 
that closed ego networks provide greater performance benefits in the slow-paced steel industry than 
in the semiconductor industry, which is characterized by significantly greater technological dynamism 
and innovation demands. 
Three points are worth noting with respect to this argument. First, to distinguish between 
closed and open ego networks, firms need not necessarily act as astute networkers. Instead of tracing 
their own network position or that of a potential partner, organizational agents may select partners 
based on the demands for value creation imposed by their industry. For example, in highly dynamic 
industries where innovation is at the core of competitive advantage, firms may be driven to select 
those partners who can provide unique and diverse skills, knowledge, and resources. Organizational 
agents may identify such partners by monitoring other firms’ innovation activities, including new 
product announcements and patent grants. As firms reach out to partners with distinct technological 
profiles, particularly those that reside in more distant parts of the network relative to their existing 
contacts, such efforts may eventually result in the formation of more open ego networks.  
Less technologically dynamic industries, in contrast, may drive firms to emphasize lower 
transaction costs and the preservation of existing resources while downplaying the potential rewards 
of continuous innovation. Under these conditions, a key criterion for partner selection may be the 
moral hazard that comes along with a new partnership. A potential partner’s reliability, in turn, may 
be easily gauged based on information provided by a firm’s existing or past contacts. Sharing a third-
party connection with a potential collaborator can thus provide assurance of reliable collaboration 
through both thorough selection and a reputational lock-in; furthermore, parties can reasonably 
expect the common contact to act as a mediator in emerging disputes (Black, 1976), precluding the 
escalation of conflict and further reducing transaction costs. Taken together, these motivations drive 
firms in industries characterized by stable technological regimes into closed ego networks. 
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Second, our argument concentrates on firms’ average tendencies to form open or closed ego 
networks across industries, and we naturally examine the entire spectrum of firms’ collaborative 
behaviors and the resulting ego-network positions. We thus do not rule out the possibility of 
encountering hybrid network positions, whereby firms can pursue closed and open ego networks 
simultaneously (Sytch et al., 2012). Indeed, we expect that the differences in technological regimes 
across industries should result in a pull toward either end of the spectrum, rather than the formation 
of purely closed or purely open ego networks. Third, it is important to note that our argument about 
how firms’ collaborative behaviors vary across industries focuses on (a) capturing firms’ average 
tendencies toward open or closed ego networks in a given industry, and (b) comparing those average 
tendencies across different industries. Accordingly, we expect that the collaborative behaviors of 
individual firms may vary both within a given industry and over time, and we incorporate such firm-
level heterogeneities in our analyses. That said, we anticipate that the differences in firms’ average 
behaviors across industries should be associated with the cross-industry variations in technological 
regimes. In sum, the arguments advanced above lead us to formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms’ pursuit of open and closed ego networks is associated with the technological regime 
prevailing in their industry, such that firms in technologically stable industries will form more closed ego 
networks while firms in technologically dynamic industries will form more open ego networks. 
Data 
To test Hypothesis 1, we used data on the technology partnerships between firms in the automotive 
industry, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, chemicals, microelectronics, new materials, and 
telecommunications. The breadth of our sample allowed us to capture significant variation in 
technological dynamism across industries and thus positioned us to examine whether and to what 
extent this variation could explain differences in the collaborative behaviors of firms. To examine 
firms’ collaborative behaviors, we traced interfirm partnerships formed between 1983 and 1999 in 
each industry in our sample. Because collaborative partnerships were rare before 1980 (Hagedoorn, 
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1996), focusing on this period enabled us to provide a detailed account of the collaborative history of 
each industry. We obtained partnership data from the MERIT-CATI database, which is among the 
most well-established and frequently used sources of empirical data on technology partnerships (e.g., 
Hagedoorn, 1993; Gulati, 1995; Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, and Jaffe, 2006). This database tracks 
a broad range of partnerships that entail knowledge exchange and development of new products or 
technologies, including joint ventures, contractual agreements, R&D consortia, and licensing deals 
(Rosenkopf and Schilling, 2007). Overall, our data included 8,810 distinct technology partnerships 
formed by 4,400 firms.  
 From this data, we subsequently reconstructed the structures of interorganizational networks 
using standard empirical procedures. More than 95% of partnership agreements in our data were 
bilateral, and we treated them accordingly as dyadic relationships. We decomposed the remaining 
multilateral partnerships into sets of dyadic ties (Stuart, 1998). Because information on partnership 
terminations was limited, we built on prior work that suggested that interorganizational partnerships 
last an average of five years (e.g., Kogut, 1988a; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Stuart, 2000; Lavie and 
Rosenkopf, 2006). To reproduce the evolution of each interorganizational system in our data from 
1987 to 1999, we thus reconstructed 13 annual network structures for each of the six industries.1  
Measures 
Dependent Variable: Open vs. Closed Ego Networks 
To differentiate between closed and open ego networks, we relied on Burt’s (1992) measure 
of ego-network constraint, defined as 2( )i ij ik kj
j k
c      . Here, ij  indicates the fraction of i’s 
                                                 
1 Note that some prior studies of interorganizational networks considered a broader spectrum of interfirm ties and used 
other sampling strategies. For example, in their study of an interorganizational networks in biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals, Powell, White, Koput, and Owen-Smith (2005) examined various financing, sales, and marketing 
agreements among dedicated biotechnology companies, while excluding ties between pharmaceutical firms. Nonetheless, 
their network showed some remarkable similarities to the interorganizational system mapped here, including high levels 
of network connectedness (Ibid: Footnote 17) and some discernible community structure (Ibid: Footnote 13). We thank 
Jason Owen-Smith for providing us with additional data that facilitated these comparisons. 
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ties with j, jk  indicates the fraction of i’s ties with k, and kj  indicates the fraction of k’s ties with j. 
This index increases with the extent to which ego’s contacts become more connected to one another 
and decreases as they become more separated from one another. Because the pursuit of closed ego 
networks involves forming ties to partners that are connected to one another, firms that exhibit such 
a behavior should obtain higher levels of constraint. In contrast, firms that hold ties to partners that 
are not directly connected to one another should obtain lower levels of constraint.  
Using this measure, we constructed two complementary sets of dependent variables. First, we 
estimated how likely an average firm is to pursue a more open (versus a more closed) ego network. It 
is important to note that in measuring these behaviors, we focused only on those firms that formed 
at least one new partnership in any given year. Doing so enabled us to get closer towards capturing 
the agency of the focal firm, in contrast to the changes in ego networks that could be a result of new 
partnerships not involving the ego (Sytch et al., 2012). For each of these firms, we first estimated the 
probability of forming a more open ego network in any year (pi). Figure 1 demonstrates this 
procedure. Suppose that from t = 0 to t = 3, A increased its constraint twice (from t = 0 to t = 1, 
and from t = 1 to t = 2), and lowered it once (from t = 2 to t = 3). This means that A’s propensity to 
form a more open ego network was pA = (0+0+1)/3 = 0.33. Using the same approach, we estimated 
B’s and C’s propensities as pB = 0.66 and pC = 0, respectively. We then checked the distribution of pi 
values for firms in each industry against a number of commonly known distribution functions. The 
results indicated that the best fit is provided by using two discrete parameters: (a) the fraction of 
firms with zero probability of forming open ego networks at any time (fracp=0), and (b) the average 
probability that the remaining firms will form open ego networks (p).  
------------------------------ 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
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Second, we specified a time-variant firm-level dependent variable Constraint Change, defined as 
ci,t – ci,t+1, where ci,t and ci,t+1 denote the focal firm’s ego-network constraint in years t and t+1, 
respectively. A positive value indicated the pursuit of a more open ego network, whereas a negative 
value indicated the pursuit of a more closed ego network.  
Independent Variable 
The central independent variable of interest was Industry-level RDI, defined as the R&D 
intensity of a focal firm's industry in year t. In line with prior research, we estimated the technological 
dynamism of an industry by measuring its R&D intensity (RDI) (Chan et al., 2001). This index 
captures firms’ aggregate R&D spending per year divided by firms’ total assets. Extant research 
indicates that technologically dynamic industries should exhibit higher levels of RDI because their 
competitive dynamics are largely driven by innovation and technological change (Chan et al., 2001; 
Rosenkopf and Schilling, 2007). We obtained data on firms’ R&D spending from COMPUSTAT 
and Orbis. Table 1 shows the average RDI measured for each of the six industries in our sample. 
The values indicate noticeable differences in technological dynamism across the six industries.2  
------------------------------ 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Control Variables 
We controlled for a range of other possible determinants of a firm’s collaborative behavior, 
all lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable. We first included a control for Industry 
Maturity, defined as the 5-year average yearly growth rate in the number of firms in an industry. We 
specified this variable as 

 
 
2 1 1
2
1/5 ( )/
t
y y y
y t
n n n , where y = t is the focal year and nt is the total 
                                                 
2 In additional analyses, we explored the variation in RDI for a larger sample of industries including software and the 
Internet, aerospace and defense, and the consumer goods industry, in addition to our focal six sectors. To do so, we drew 
on more recent R&D data for 1,000 public companies over the period 2005–2011 provided by Booz & Company’s Global 
Innovation 1000 study. These additional results confirmed our original rank ordering of industries in terms of their RDI. 
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number of firms operating in the industry in year t (cf. Klepper and Graddy, 1990; McGahan and 
Silverman, 2001). Lower growth rates generally characterize mature industries facing diminishing 
market opportunities and growing consolidation. In contrast, higher rates are typically associated 
with younger industries. We obtained the yearly counts of firms per industry from the CRSP 
database. Second, we controlled for the competitive intensity of an industry using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of Industry Concentration (Hirschman, 1964). For each industry and year, we defined 
this index as the sum of squares of the annual sales of the 50 largest firms in the industry. Third, we 
controlled for Network Size, which captured the total number of firms present in the network in year 
t, and for Network Avg. Degree, which captured the average number of network ties per firm in year t. 
These control variables accounted for the possibility that both larger and sparser interorganizational 
networks could make it structurally easier for firms to pursue more open ego networks.  
In addition, we controlled for a number of behavioral determinants at the level of the focal 
firm. First, to capture the firm's market performance and financial condition, we included a control 
for its Sales and Return on Assets (ROA) in year t. Second, we controlled for Firm-level R&D Intensity, 
which was defined as the ratio between the firm's R&D spending in year t and its total assets in that 
year. This control helped us account for the possibility that the formation of an open ego network 
could reflect the firm's own technological dynamism, rather than the dynamism of its external 
environment. Third, to account for the characteristics of a firm's current ego network, we controlled 
for the firm-level Network Constraint in year t using the previously introduced measure of ego-network 
constraint. The Sales and Firm-level R&D Intensity controls were entered into the model as logged 
terms due to their skewed distributions over firms. Finally, in order to account for any unobserved 
time effects, we entered a set of eleven Year Fixed Effects, with 1987 specified as the default year.  
Analysis 
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Hypothesis 1 predicted that firms in technologically dynamic industries are likely to form more open 
ego networks, while firms in technologically stable industries are likely to form more closed ego 
networks. To test this hypothesis, we used two types of analyses. First, we conducted a correlation 
analysis to test the relationship between Industry-level RDI and firms’ average, time-invariant 
propensity to form more open ego networks as estimated by fracp=0 and p. Second, we conducted a 
regression analysis to estimate the time-varying collaborative behavior of any active firm in the 
industry (as measured by the firm’s Constraint Change from t to t+1) as a function of Industry-level RDI. 
In addition, the regression analysis also allowed us to control for a range of other determinants of the 
firm’s collaborative behavior, including the potential effect of Industry Maturity.  
Given the nested structure of the data, we estimated the model using the multilevel, mixed-
effects regression technique, which mitigates the risk of biased parameter estimates and incorrect 
standard errors (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). Specifically, we applied a three-level model with the 
firm’s Constraint Change in a given year specified at Level 1 and random intercepts specified at the 
firm level (Level 2) and the industry level (Level 3). Additional analyses indicated that adding random 
coefficients at any level does not improve model fit. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and 
correlations for the independent and control variables. The mean variance inflation factor (VIF) of 
1.83 suggests that multicollinearity did not pose a serious concern (Belsey, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980). 
Results 
The correlation between fracp=0 and RDI is -0.99 (p < 0.001), and the correlation between p and RDI 
is 0.75 (p < 0.1). These results support our expectation that firms should generally pursue more open 
ego networks in those industries that are characterized higher levels of technological dynamism, as 
measured by Industry-level RDI. The results of the regression analysis in Table 3, in turn, demonstrate 
that the effect of Industry-level RDI on a firm’s propensity to form more open ego networks is positive 
and statistically significant (b = 1.769, p < 0.01). This evidence thus further supports our hypothesis 
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and the findings of the correlation analysis. Notably, this effect holds even after accounting for the 
effects of industry maturity (i.e. the corresponding coefficient is statistically insignificant), the focal 
firm’s R&D intensity, firm size, financial condition, and the firm’s current ego-network position.3 
----------------------------------- 
Tables 2 & 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 show that firms’ collaborative behaviors differ significantly across industries, 
in line with the observed variations in the industries' technological regimes. As predicted by our 
theory, we found that higher levels of technological dynamism provide a greater drive for firms to 
pursue more open ego networks as compared with more stable industrial environments, in which 
firms were found to generally pursue more closed ego networks. Study 1, however, stops short of 
exploring whether the demonstrated firm-level variations lead to the emergence of distinct global 
network properties at the industry level. Building on the results of Study 1, we therefore address this 
question in Study 2. In particular, in the following study we explore to what extent the emergent 
industry-wide networks differ in terms of their global properties as firms respond to the variable 
innovation demands of their industries by pursuing either more open or more closed ego networks. 
STUDY 2: ORIGINS OF DISTINCT INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK FORMS 
Network analysts have devised a comprehensive set of concepts to describe the structural properties 
of social systems (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Within this vast array of concepts, network 
connectedness and the network’s community structure stand out as fundamental for understanding how 
social systems shape actors’ outcomes (see Figure 2). Scholars have observed that high network 
connectedness and strong community structure help explain a range of dynamic network processes, 
                                                 
3 We also examined the possibility that more mature industries could be characterized by more densely interconnected 
partnership systems. Such dense networks could make it more difficult for firms to pursue more open ego networks. Our 
analyses revealed that the empirical networks analyzed in the present study are characterized by statistically similar density 
levels, which rules out the possibility that our results could be driven by network density. 
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such as the diffusion of innovations (Wejnert, 2002), exchange of information (Dodds, Muhamad, 
and Watts, 2003), social influence (Moody, 2001), or the spread of infectious diseases (Anderson and 
May, 1991). In interorganizational networks, both concepts have been linked to the adoption of 
innovations, diffusion of governance practices, and the dissemination of knowledge among firms 
(e.g., Davis and Greve, 1997; Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Rogers, 2003). Network connectedness 
reflects the extent to which network actors can reach one another via network ties (see Figures 1a 
and 1b). High network connectedness indicates that most firms can access one another via a network 
path of some length. This feature supports the flows of knowledge, information and influence 
among firms. In contrast, low connectedness indicates that most firms are structurally isolated from 
one another and are thus inhibited from accessing other firms’ knowledge and resources. 
------------------------------ 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 Unlike connectedness, community structure captures the distribution (rather than existence) of 
network ties throughout the network (Granovetter, 1973; Girvan and Newman, 2002; Sytch and 
Tatarynowicz, 2014a). Strong community structure signals that the distribution of ties is uneven and 
that the network is characterized by the presence of many relatively small groups (or communities) of 
densely interconnected firms. In contrast, weak community structure suggests a more homogenous  
distribution of ties, such that no particularly dense groups can be distinguished (see Figures 2c and 
2d). Network community structure has been linked to a variety of collective outcomes of actors. For 
example, dense network communities have been shown to enable the development of unique pools 
of knowledge shared among firms (Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014a), and to act as vehicles of 
cohesion, social norms, and social influence (Moody and White, 2003; Rogers, 2003; Greve, 2009). 
Some studies have also suggested that network communities are among the key conditions necessary 
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to withstand the homogeneity pressures and to sustain sufficient levels of knowledge diversity in 
creative environments (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005; Lazer and Friedman, 2007; Gulati et al., 2012). 
 Holding all other network properties constant, we can expect that in sparsely connected 
partnership systems (Rosenkopf and Schilling, 2007) the formation of more open ego networks 
should lead to higher levels of network connectedness but weaker community structures. As firms 
extend their partnerships into wider swaths of the system, the number of widely dispersed ties should 
go up while the number of local ties should go down, increasing the system’s connectedness. Yet, in 
sparsely connected networks communities generally tend to be weaker by virtue of containing fewer 
local ties. As such, the process of redistributing the ties across wider swaths of the network may 
come at the expense of community structure. By the same token, sparse interorganizational networks 
may be subject to opposite pressures in those industries in which firms generally pursue more closed 
ego networks. Since in those industries firms tend to place their ties in more proximate parts of the 
overall network, the emergent industry-wide systems should be characterized by stronger community 
structures but lower network connectedness. Similar tradeoffs were anticipated in some formal 
representations of network dynamics in interpersonal settings (Rapoport, 1957; Skvoretz, Fararo, and 
Agneessens, 2004), and in empirical work on the dynamics of interfirm networks (Gulati et al., 2012).  
It is worth noting that when applied to stylized low-density networks, the argument regarding 
the tradeoff between community structure and network connectedness could perhaps be derived 
analytically. However, our specific question, which is posed in the context of real-world partnership 
systems, is significantly more complex than that. First, although we know that the formation of open 
and closed ego networks varies across industries, it remains an empirical question to what extent this 
variation can lead to observable differences in the emergent industry-wide networks. Should the 
variation in firms’ collaborative behaviors across industries not be strong enough, the relationship 
between firms’ behaviors and the emergent industry-wide networks could ultimately be weak.  
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Second, even if we were to assume that the relationship between firms’ varying behaviors and 
the emergent industry-wide networks is strong, we still need to examine the precise nature of that 
relationship to understand exactly when distinct networks can emerge and what are their properties. 
Specifically, we need to identify at which levels of firms’ preferences for open versus closed ego 
networks the expected transitions from low to high network connectedness and from strong to weak 
community structures can occur. It is entirely possible that both properties may not follow a linear 
pattern of change but rather feature more complex, nonlinear transitions. For example, some formal 
studies of main component formation indicated that network connectedness is a rather malleable 
structural property while changes in community structure are more difficult to trigger (Newman and 
Watts, 1999). Such nonlinear transitions could effectively engender the emergence of intermediate 
network forms, which could combine high levels of connectedness and strong community structures.  
Considering the complexities of our argument, we therefore abstain from hypothesizing the 
emergence of specific network forms linked to particular levels of the firms’ propensity for either 
more open or more closed ego networks. Instead, we formulate a general prediction that the cross-
industry variations in firms’ collaborative behaviors should give rise to distinct industry-wide 
networks characterized by different levels of network connectedness and community structure:  
Hypothesis 2: Firms’ greater propensity to pursue open ego networks across industries will lead to the 
emergence of distinct types of industry-wide networks showing significantly higher levels of network 
connectedness and weaker community structures. 
Methods and Analyses 
To test Hypothesis 2, we applied a mixed-methods approach that combined empirical analyses of 
existing interorganizational networks with agent-based modeling. The agent-based model allowed us 
to perform a series of controlled experiments in which actual firm behaviors are compared with 
numerous counterfactuals, many of which are unobserved in real data. By experimenting along the 
entire continuum of firms’ collaborative behaviors from closed to open ego networks, we were thus 
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able to observe the often complex and nonlinear effects that relate actors’ micro-behaviors to the 
emergence of macro-level social and economic systems (Schelling, 1978). A particular advantage of 
the agent-based model in that respect was that it did not impose any strict assumptions regarding the 
nature of the hypothesized micro-macro relationships, whether linear or non-linear. 
More fundamentally, the agent-based model enabled us to achieve an abstract and yet 
detailed representation of real-world network dynamics, in which the network’s properties are 
assumed to co-evolve with actors’ behaviors. This resulted in an interdependent social system in 
which the evolving network is not just shaped by firms’ direct interactions with one another but also 
by their indirect interactions through the emergent industry-wide network itself. Importantly, our 
modeling approach reflected a growing emphasis on agent-based simulations in organizational 
research that occurs alongside a growing interest in the processes of network emergence and 
dynamics (Ahuja, Soda, and Zaheer, 2012). The empirical element in our approach, in turn, allowed 
us to use real-world data both to calibrate the simulation model analytically and to validate it against 
empirical evidence. While helping us to directly trace the complex dynamics of network emergence, 
the mixed-methods approach thus also positioned us well to explore how strongly the networks we 
observe empirically differ from one another, as well as how strongly they differ from other possible 
networks that are predicted by the model but are not directly observed in our data (Bonabeau, 2002). 
Analysis of Global Network Properties  
We assessed the variation in global network properties using the previous concepts of network 
connectedness and community structure (see Figure 2). We defined network connectedness formally as 
  2/k
k
C n N , where nk is the size of the k-th network component and N is the size of the entire 
network. This index captures how many components are in the network and how they vary in terms 
of sizes. The possible values range from close to 0 for a highly disconnected network that contains 
many small components, to 1 for a fully connected network that contains one large component. 
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To measure community structure, we used the well-known method of Girvan and Newman 
(2002).4 This method detects communities by computing the network's modularity index defined as 
 1/ ( { })kk kk
k
Q e e e . Here, e is the total number of ties in the network, kke  is the number of ties 
in the k-th community, and { }kke  is the expected number of ties within communities estimated from 
a baseline network that connects firms at random while preserving the same distribution of ties as in 
the observed network. Effectively, this method evaluates to what extent the observed network differs 
from a fully random network in terms of its community structure. However, because the number of 
possible community splits grows exponentially with network size, finding the best split typically turns 
into an extensive search problem that requires various heuristics and optimization algorithms. In our 
analysis, we relied on the simulated annealing algorithm proposed by Guimera and Amaral (2005). Prior 
research has evaluated this algorithm as particularly fast and efficient in finding maximum modularity 
associated with the best network community split (Danon, Diaz-Guilera, Duch, and Arenas, 2005). 
Table 4 reports the values of network connectedness and community structure along with 
the size, average degree, and density of each network, averaged over the study period. As expected, 
we found the six networks in our sample to exhibit rather different structural forms, ranging from 
highly connected (biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, microelectronics, and telecommunications) to 
rather disconnected systems (automotive, chemicals, and new materials); and from strong community 
structures (biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and new materials) to medium community 
structures (automotive, microelectronics, and telecommunications). Somewhat unexpectedly, we also 
found that the anticipated tradeoffs between network connectedness and community structure do 
                                                 
4 Our conceptualization of network communities builds on the structural accounts of communities as dense and cohesive 
social groups, whose members are closer to each other than to other actors in the system (e.g., Laumann, Galaskiewicz, 
and Marsden, 1978; Laumann and Marsden, 1979). This view is consistent with prior studies that built on the behavioral 
account of communities as interactional fields (Kaufman, 1959; Turk, 1970; Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974), where network  
communities were considered as being shaped by local interactions and the resulting social proximities among actors. 
 20
not apply equally to all industries; indeed, the system in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals indicated 
both a high level of network connectedness and a strong community structure.5 
------------------------------ 
Table 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
Agent-based Model of Interorganizational Network Emergence 
We simulated the process of network emergence starting from a random Erdös-Rényi network with 
a fixed number of firms (denoted N) and a fixed average number of ties per firm (denoted k). In 
such a network, any two firms are connected with an equal probability k/(N-1) (Erdos and Renyi, 
1959). This approach offered us several advantages (for alternative starting conditions see Appendix 
2). First, starting from a purely random network that is unlikely to be the result of any systematic 
processes of tie formation provided an uncontaminated testing ground to explore how the simulated 
firm behaviors could transform and shape the emergent network systems. Second, an Erdös-Rényi 
network also helped us approximate the empirically observed variation in partnership counts among 
firms in any given industry (Cowan and Jonard, 2004; Rosenkopf and Schilling, 2007).6 Finally, we 
used constant network size and network density to maintain consistent analytic conditions across  
different simulation runs (cf. Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001; Buskens and van de Rijt, 2008). 
The network  system emerges as firms form new ties to one another, thereby realizing their 
preferences for more open versus more closed ego networks.7 The model distinguishes between 
open and closed ego networks using Burt’s (1992) measure of network constraint. Figure 3 illustrates 
how the process works. Suppose that A is the ego; B, D, and E are A’s current alters; and C, F, G, 
                                                 
5 Additional analyses confirmed that the observed structural differences among industry-wide networks persist over time. 
6 The distribution of tie counts in the Erdös-Rényi network is roughly Poisson (Newman, 2010). 
7 Rather than having firms choose between open and closed ego networks, an alternative model would be to allow firms 
to connect either locally (within their own network community) or globally (outside their community). Such a model 
could perhaps explain the observed changes in community structure and network connectedness more directly. One key 
limitation that makes this model less plausible, however, is that not all interorganizational networks contain strong 
community structures that may affect firms’ behaviors equally (Rosenkopf and Schilling, 2007). According to our results, 
for example, the degree of community structure varies from medium to strong between different industrial contexts. Our 
model, which limits firms’ focus to their proximate ego networks (rather than to broader communities), allowed us to 
extend the analysis to a wider spectrum of interorganizational networks with variable degrees of community structure. 
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and H are A’s potential alters. A first ranks its potential alters according to the expected change in 
network constraint. For illustrative purposes, Figure 3 provides A’s constraint at time t (cA,t = 0.59) 
and its expected constraint at t+1 following the formation of a new tie (cA,t+1 = [0.46, 0.48, 0.66]). In 
our example, the greatest negative change in A's network constraint is associated with alter G (cA,t+1 
= 0.46), and the greatest positive change is associated with alter C (cA,t+1= 0.66). Depending on A's 
preference for a more open or more closed ego network, A should thus partner with either G or C.  
------------------------------ 
Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
We defined an ego’s decision to pursue a more open versus more closed ego network using a 
probabilistic parameter p. In technical terms, this parameter reflected the ego’s probability to pursue 
an alter associated with the greatest decrease in ego’s network constraint. The ego’s probability to 
pursue an alter associated the greatest increase in constraint was thus 1 – p. To ensure some degree of 
matching between the preferences of the ego and the alter, the model considered both actors’ 
constraint preferences and allowed only for those ties that reflected the alter’s expectations, as well. 
Otherwise, the ego would pursue the next best option.8 
Furthermore, we set the same level of p for all firms in the industry and used this modeling 
approach to distinguish between firms’ varying collaborative behaviors across industries. Although 
this modeling approach implied that all firms in an industry would be subject to the same average 
propensity to pursue more open ego networks, in practice our model featured substantial behavioral 
heterogeneity across firms. This was primarily guaranteed by the stochastic nature of the network 
formation process, which allowed individual firms to act entirely differently than an average firm. In 
addition, each firm would also be exposed to different local network structures determining the 
                                                 
8 We modeled this process by allowing the alter to reject a tie if forming it would not change its constraint level in the 
desired direction. The ego would then simply move down the list to the next available alter, with the possibility of not 
forming a new tie at all. This process was thus akin to a satisficing behavioral model (Simon, 1947). An alternative 
approach would be to consider a maximizing behavioral model, in which both actors must draw maximum benefits from 
the new tie. We discuss this possibility in Appendix 2. 
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access to and the availability of potential partners (cf. Ibarra, Kilduff, and Tsai, 2005). Taken 
together, our specifications ensured close representation of a real-world interorganizational setting.  
Building on prior work, we also included a range of other behavioral mechanisms to ensure 
realistic modeling. First, because organizational agents are unlikely to observe the entire social space 
around them, we assumed that an ego’s probability to observe any potential alter declines as a 
function of network distance (Friedkin, 1983). Formally, we specified the probability that i can 
observe j as 1/(dij-1), where dij is the number of links along the shortest network path between i and 
j. Should j be entirely unobservable to i by virtue of the two actors residing in disconnected network 
components, we assumed that a tie between i and j is still possible, albeit with a very low probability 
equal to 1/(N-1). This rule allowed us to consider the dynamics of real interorganizational networks, 
in which both isolates and disconnected network components can occasionally become connected.9 
Second, we assumed that two partners can terminate their existing relationship and that the 
likelihood of relationship termination varies by tie duration. In modeling this process, we built on 
prior research indicating that partnership terminations are often time-consuming and costly, and that 
alliance partners typically avoid premature contract terminations (Malhotra and Lumineau, 2011). 
Consistent with the observation that interorganizational partnerships have a clear average lifespan 
(Kogut, 1988b; Gulati, 1995; Stuart, 2000), we specified a normally distributed duration of ties with a 
mean of 10 time steps and a standard deviation of 2 time steps. With the total simulation length of 
100 time steps, our analyses thus extended over ten full partnership formation rounds by firms.10  
Third, in order to compare the results among different simulation runs and across different 
time steps, the agent-based model required us to control for changes in network density. To ensure 
                                                 
9 Information on potential partners may also travel outside the network and come from other sources, such as media, the 
Internet, or various industry events and conferences (Rosenkopf, Metiu, and George, 2001). As a result, even those firms 
that dissolve all their ties may still find a way to form new partnerships and reenter the network (Powell et al., 2005). 
10 It may be helpful to consider these modeling choices in the context of the dynamics of real interorganizational systems, 
in which two simulation steps could correspond to one year in the data. This means that 10 time steps could correspond 
to 5 years, which constitutes the typical lifespan of an interorganizational tie in our sample. Our entire analysis could thus 
be regarded as equivalent to tracing the evolution of a real interorganizational system over the period of some 50 years. 
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constant density, we controlled that the number of ties terminated in each time step is exactly the 
same as the number of newly created ties. We modeled this process by first selecting two random 
subsets of firms that were chosen independently of each other but could overlap. Both subsets were 
given the same sizes equal to 15% of the entire network, which closely reflected the dynamics of real 
interorganizational networks in our data. Then, each firm in the first subset was allowed to create 
one new tie per time step, while each firm in the second subset was allowed to delete one of its 
existing ties. Finally, firms could connect both to entirely new partners and to partners who were 
either their current or past ties. This condition helped us introduce further realism into the model.  
Model Validation Against Empirical Data 
 To validate the model empirically, we explored how closely it represents real collaborative 
behaviors of firms observed across different industrial settings. A useful validation test entails 
examining whether the model—when supplied with the actual collaborative behaviors of firms—
reproduces roughly the same levels of network connectedness and community structure as those 
found in the real setting (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2007). We specified firms’ collaborative 
behaviors using the empirical values of the fraction of firms with zero probability to form an open 
ego network (fracp=0) and the propensity of the remaining firms to form a more open ego network 
(p). To guarantee some baseline concordance with the conditions of each industry, we also matched 
the size and density of each network with the corresponding empirical values (see Table 1). For each 
industry, we conducted 100 simulations to mitigate stochastic variation in the results and recorded 
average levels of connectedness and community structure along with their standard deviations.  
 We then compared these results statistically with the corresponding properties obtained from 
real interorganizational networks using z-scores. Specifically, for network connectedness we specified 
 [ ( )]/C Cz C E C , where C is the connectedness of the empirical network, and E(C) and C  are 
the mean and standard deviation levels of connectedness measured for the simulated network (Szell, 
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Lambiotte, and Thurner, 2010). For community structure, we specified  [ ( )]/Q Qz Q E Q  where 
Q is the modularity of the empirical network, and E(Q) and  Q  are the mean and standard deviation 
levels of modularity produced by the simulation model. Table 5 illustrates close correspondence 
between the real and simulated networks, thus indicating that our model is empirically valid and can 
produce generalizeable results (Davis et al., 2007).11 
------------------------------ 
Table 5 about here 
------------------------------ 
Analytic Procedure 
To understand the precise link between firms’ local behaviors and the emergent global 
network properties, we conducted the simulation over the entire range of conceivable values of 
fracp=0 and p. We obtained these values by varying both parameters over the maximum range from 0 
to 1 in 0.01 increments. This procedure resulted in a comprehensive set of 101 μ 101 = 10,201 
analytic cases. To achieve a realistic interorganizational setting, we again followed our descriptive 
results and those of prior research in specifying the key model parameters (Rosenkopf and Schilling, 
2007). This involved modeling a medium-sized network with 200 firms with an average of four ties 
per firm (see Appendix 2 for alternative specifications). For each set of fracp=0 and p values, we 
simulated the network for 100 time steps to ensure sufficient stability in the emergent network 
properties (see Appendix 1 for a formal analysis of model stability). To mitigate stochastic variance, 
we repeated the simulation 100 times for each analytic case and recorded average levels of network 
connectedness and community structure. Overall, our complete analysis involved conducting 
1,020,100 simulation runs to generate the final results. 
Results 
                                                 
11 The results of this test support our model but cannot explicitly rule out other behavioral mechanisms that could be 
present in our empirical context and could possibly lead to other types of networks. We therefore additionally tested a 
range of alternative models of network formation among firms. We report these results in Appendix 2. 
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We summarize our final results in Figure 4 using two-dimensional heat maps. The results are 
consistent with the basic intuition of Hypothesis 2, which suggested that as firms’ propensity for 
open ego networks increases the emergent industry-wide networks should be more connected and 
should exhibit weaker community structures. Two results are particularly striking, though. First, 
Figure 4a indicates that a sharp initial increase in network connectedness occurs over a relatively 
narrow range of p values.12 Second, Figure 4b documents that community structure follows a more 
stable pattern over p. Particularly noteworthy, however, is the fact that the initial increase in p is 
accompanied by a growing (rather than a declining) community structure. This appears somewhat at 
odds with Hypothesis 2, which predicted that in sufficiently sparse systems the formation of open 
ego networks should weaken (rather than strengthen) the system’s community structure.13  
Figure 5 below provides a more precise illustration of the above transition effects. In this 
figure, we plotted a representative set of scenarios with low fracp=0, medium fracp=0, and high fracp=0, 
tracing the changes in network connectedness and community structure over the entire range of p 
values. The individual plots were produced by fitting a series of Bézier curves that help smooth out 
the results of different simulations (Farin, 1997). Using their first-order derivatives, we also estimated 
when each of the fitted Bézier curves indicates a transition in slope from positive to negative.14 Our 
analytic results suggest a rather complex, nonlinear pattern of co-variance that occurs along exactly 
the same set of inflection points (p = 0.15, fracp=0 = 0; p = 0.22, fracp=0 = 0.35; and p = 0.34, fracp=0 
                                                 
12 This process is akin to the rise of a giant component as the network’s density goes up, a dynamic that was noted in 
some prior studies (de Sola Pool and Kochem, 1978; Skvoretz, 1991; Holme and Newman, 2006). In our case, however, 
connectedness increases not because actors are adding new ties to the network at random, but because they are spreading 
their ties more widely across the entire system. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us towards this parallel. 
13 One way to understand these results is to explore where the observed changes in community structure come from: 
inside or outside the main network component. As firms create more open ego networks, the initial boost in community 
structure may come from outside the main component and be the result of integrating other, smaller components into 
the main component. Given only weak firm propensities toward open ego networks, however, this process is unlikely to 
fully absorb the other components and thus eliminate any emergent community structure. Rather, the integrated 
components may continue to exist inside the main component as distinct network communities. But after the transition 
toward a highly connected network is finalized, firms’ opportunities to pursue more open ego networks by connecting 
outside their component may diminish. Instead, firms may be increasingly required to pursue open ego networks across 
the distinct network communities that exist inside the main component. Taken together, these processes may form the 
basis of an initial rise and a subsequent decline in community structure, as observed in our results. 
14 These analyses are not reported but are available from the authors upon request. 
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= 0.70 for both network connectedness and community structure). Within this pattern of co-
variance, there are certain intervals that are characterized by rather intuitive effects, such as the quick 
rise of connectedness over low p and the subsequent decline of community structure over medium 
to high p. However, these results also indicate that a simple linear trade-off between both properties 
does not exist at all levels of p. Instead, the plots show a concurrent rise in both network properties over 
low p values and a subsequently more stable trend in connectedness than in community structure.15  
------------------------------ 
Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
------------------------------ 
Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------ 
 Taken together, these results allow us to develop a general typology of the emergent network 
archetypes that are engendered by varying firm preferences towards either more open or more closed 
ego networks. These network archetypes are characterized by significant differences in the emergent 
global properties of network connectedness and community structure (see Figure 6). The first 
network archetype is characterized by low connectedness and a rather strong community structure. 
Because this configuration is reminiscent of a set of clans with strong in-group ties and almost no 
existing ties to other groups, we call it a clan network (Figure 6a). In our results, clans appeared to be 
associated with the lowest firm propensities to form more open ego networks. For example, in the 
set of scenarios with fracp=0 = 0, clan networks were found for p < 0.15.  
 The second network archetype is characterized by high connectedness and a medium-to-
strong community structure. It is noteworthy that this structure corresponds to an intermediate 
network form that is linked to the complex nonlinearities that were uncovered by our agent-based 
model. In view of the sparsely interconnected and dense network communities that populate this 
                                                 
15 We also found that network connectedness plateaus at around C = 0.8 instead of reaching the maximum value of 1.0. 
One explanation could be that by dissolving their ties, firms automatically introduce some fractures into the system, 
which then serve to prevent the emergence of a single-component network (see Online Supplement 1 for videos that 
illustrate this process). 
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system, we call it a community network (Figure 6b). Our analysis indicated that community networks are 
associated with firms’ moderate propensities for more open ego networks. For example, in the set of 
scenarios with fracp=0 = 0, community networks were found from p = 0.15, where community 
structure peaks at Q = 0.7, to p = 0.65, where community structure drops below Q = 0.5.  
Finally, the third network archetype we identify in our results is described by high network 
connectedness and a rather weak community structure.16 This structural form features more disorder 
than the previous two, bearing some resemblance to a large public gathering; we therefore call it a 
convention network (Figure 6c). In our results, convention networks seemed to be associated with 
strong firm propensities toward open ego networks. For example, in the set of scenarios with fracp=0 
= 0, convention networks were found for p > 0.65. Using a series of one-way ANOVA tests (Table 
6), we found that this typology indeed represents a set of statistically significant differences in the 
networks’ connectedness and community structure (connectedness: F = 278,270.49, p < 0.001; 
community structure: F = 10,960.46, p < 0.001). The complete typology is plotted in Figure 6d.17  
 
 
------------------------------ 
Figure 6 about here 
------------------------------ 
------------------------------ 
Table 6 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
In a representative application of our typology, we explored which network archetype best 
characterizes our sample of industries. Given that the networks in automotive, chemicals, and new 
materials were found to combine rather low connectedness with strong community structures, and 
                                                 
16 Our description of a convention network as a system with a rather weak community structure is consistent with other 
work on network cohesion, including the work of Moody and White (2003) who defined cohesion as the presence of 
multiconnectivity among actors. According to their view, cohesive social groups are those that manage to withstand 
separation even in the face of losing multiple in-group ties. Although it is possible that an entire network could display 
such a property by virtue of offering sufficient tie redundancy to withstand separation, the convention networks 
produced by our model were not sufficiently dense to provide such system-level cohesion. 
17 We also validated these differences post hoc using the Tukey-Kramer test of deviance, which allowed us to compare a 
given network archetype directly against the other two types using a standard t-score. The results of this additional test 
consistently indicated significant pairwise differences in network connectedness and community structure (p < 0.001). 
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that this configuration seemed to be the result of relatively weak firm propensities toward open ego 
networks, we classified these systems as clan networks. In turn, the networks in biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals, microelectronics, and telecommunications were all found to combine high network 
connectedness with medium-to-strong community structures driven by moderate firm propensities 
toward open ego networks. Hence, we classified them as community networks. To illustrate our 
classification, Figure 7 provides two real-world images of (a) a clan network in the new materials 
industry in 1994, and (b) a community network in the telecommunications industry in 1994. Broadly 
speaking, these results suggest that clan networks may be associated with technologically more stable 
environments, while community networks may arise in environments that are characterized by greater 
technological dynamism. Notably, our data showed no evidence of an existing convention network. 
------------------------------ 
Figure 7 about here 
------------------------------ 
Discussion 
The findings of Study 2 demonstrate that the variation in firms’ collaborative behaviors leads to the 
emergence of three distinct network archetypes. Clan networks, which combine rather low network 
connectedness with strong community structures, are associated with the lowest firm propensities to 
form more open ego networks. As a result, we find that such networks tend to describe industries 
with low levels of technological dynamism, such as chemicals, automotive, and new materials. 
Community networks, in contrast, combine high network connectedness with medium-to-strong 
community structures, and we find that such networks are engendered by moderate firm propensities 
toward open ego networks. As a result, these networks are associated with technologically dynamic 
industries, such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, microelectronics, and telecommunications. 
Finally, convention networks are distinguished by high network connectedness and rather weak 
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community structures that result from firms’ strongest tendencies towards open ego networks. Such 
networks are not found in our empirical data and we address this finding in the General Discussion. 
Extensions to the Analysis of Collective Outcomes 
So far, we have deliberately limited our focus to the study of variations in industry-wide network 
structures. However, underlying this focus is an assumption that the macro-level structures of 
industry-wide networks can be highly consequential for various collective outcomes of firms. We 
briefly explored this assumption in supplementary analyses, where we modeled a simple process of 
knowledge diffusion across the industry network. In line with prior research, we considered a basic 
process of knowledge diffusion where the probability of knowledge transfer between two firms is a 
function of (a) the existence of a network tie between the two firms, and (b) the firms' level of 
familiarity and trust in each other (Rogers, 2003). We modeled firms’ familiarity and trust using the 
sum of their current and past ties and the fraction of ties held to the same third parties, respectively 
(Gulati, 1995). We considered a dynamic model of network diffusion in which new knowledge 
diffuses in parallel with the processes of network emergence (Cowan, 2005).18 We subsequently 
evaluated how quickly and broadly new knowledge can diffuse over the emergent network. 
Results suggest that among the three archetypes of networks analyzed in the present study, 
community networks have the greatest capacity to sustain the diffusion process. Such networks 
facilitate the spread of new knowledge for two reasons. First, they help attain higher levels of 
network connectedness, which allows knowledge to spread more widely across the emergent industry 
system. Second, they also help firms attain higher levels of familiarity and trust in one another, which 
are enabled by the emergent structure of dense and cohesive network communities. Clan networks 
                                                 
18 Modeling the dynamics of network formation independently from the dynamics of diffusion is consistent with the 
majority of empirical work on network diffusion, which typically assumes independence between the two processes (e.g., 
Haunschild, 1994; Davis and Greve, 1997). Furthermore, a model in which diffusion interferes with network formation 
might preclude us from capturing the precise impact of the emergent network on diffusion outcomes. In some diffusion 
scenarios, for example, the dynamics of network formation could be shaped by actors’ desire to access knowledge via 
new ties. Future work could examine such interdependent dynamics of network structure and diffusion in more detail. 
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provide a rather strong community structure as well, but they fail to offer enough global range to 
facilitate knowledge flows. Thus, compared to community networks, clan networks inhibit diffusion. 
Interestingly, we found that clan networks perform better at spreading new among firms 
knowledge than convention networks. Given that firms are significantly more isolated from one 
another in clan networks than in convention networks, we expected to see the opposite effect (cf. 
Davis and Greve, 1997; Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell, 1997). In additional analyses, we found that 
clan networks tend to provide a rather dynamic network setting that enables sufficient knowledge 
access via temporary network ties that span different network components (see Online Supplements 
2-3). Over time, such transient bridges may effectively substitute for permanent connections through 
the wider network, thus mitigating the negative effects of low overall connectedness.  
One example of a transient bridging tie in our data was the 1989 joint venture between the 
Japanese automaker Daihatsu and Balkancar, a state-owned Bulgarian manufacturer of large utility 
vehicles. The two companies got together to exchange knowledge and pool resources to eventually 
come up with the first Japanese–Bulgarian truck. Although the partnership got off to a good start 
and in the beginning managed to facilitate substantial knowledge transfer between both firms, it 
dissolved as the political turmoil swept across Eastern Europe in early 1990’s. The two companies 
have not collaborated ever since, and ties between members of their respective network communities 
have been just as rare. Another example of a transient bridge was the 1992 alliance between BP and the 
Japanese new materials specialist Ube Industries. Here, the objective was to transfer knowledge and 
technology with the shared goal of developing a new line of low-density plastics. The partnership 
ended in 1997 with both companies as well as their respective network communities remaining 
disconnected ever since. Thus, this transient bridge also stands out for its key role in supporting 
knowledge flows across wider areas of the industry-wide network (see also Online Supplement 3). 
 31
Existing studies treat network connectedness as one of the key determinants of diffusion 
(Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1957; Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Cowan, 2005). Our study and the 
examples we just shared, however, suggest that successful diffusion does not necessarily require high 
overall levels of connectedness. Even if the overall network appears as rather disconnected, this static 
image could mask the system’s dynamic capacity to compensate through transient bridging ties that 
can offer sufficient range for a system-wide diffusion, albeit over relatively short periods of time. An 
important implication of this finding is that understanding actors’ collective outcomes may require 
reframing network connectedness as a dynamic system property. As our additional analyses suggest, 
for example, repositioning network connectedness as a dynamic system property could significantly 
enhance our conclusions with respect to the link between social structure and knowledge diffusion.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION  
This work was motivated by the recognition that the networks we observe in different social and 
economic settings vary significantly in terms of their structural properties, and that this variation can 
be consequential for a range of collective outcomes of actors. With this insight in mind, we set out to 
explore the differences in the structures of interorganizational networks among firms. We presented 
two complementary studies that combined empirical analyses of several interorganizational networks 
with agent-based modeling of interorganizational network emergence. Our first study showed that 
firms’ collaborative behaviors vary significantly with the technological dynamism of the industry. 
Complementing these results, the second study showed that this behavioral variation can lead to the 
emergence of distinct structural forms of the industry-wide network. 
Our combined results represent an important step toward an environmental contingency 
theory of network formation. This theory proposes a close association between the characteristics of 
the environment in which actors reside and the processes of network formation among actors. In 
relation to this theory, we demonstrated that organizations may be responding to the environmental 
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demands not only in terms of their internal organizational design (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Davis 
et al., 2009), but also in terms of the patterns of collaboration with other organizations. The main 
findings of the paper are thus twofold. In our first study, we found that in technologically dynamic 
industries firms on average pursue more open ego networks. In contrast, in technologically stable 
industries firms on average pursue more closed ego networks. This effect likely indicates that firms in 
technologically dynamic industries may favor access to novel and non-redundant knowledge and 
resources, which is best enabled by open ego networks. In technologically stable industries, in turn, 
firms may favor the benefits of resource preservation and safe collaboration, which are best enabled 
by closed ego networks.  
In our second study, we explored whether the variations in firms' collaborative behaviors 
across industries are sufficiently strong to lead to the emergence of distinct industry-wide networks. 
In our extensive analyses, we found that although the differences in firms’ behaviors seem rather 
subtle, they result in entirely different industrial network archetypes characterized by significant 
differences in network connectedness and community structure. These effects seem to result from 
the complex interactions between firms’ local behaviors and the emergent global network properties. 
With respect to this finding, our results indicated that technologically stable industries are associated 
with the emergence of clan networks which exhibit low connectedness and a rather strong community 
structure. More dynamic industries, in contrast, are associated with the emergence of community 
networks which exhibit high network connectedness and medium-to-strong community structures.  
The results of Study 2 also revealed another network archetype, a convention network, which 
showed high connectedness and a weak community structure. In our model, the convention network 
was produced by firms’ strong tendencies to pursue open ego networks. Interestingly, the convention 
network was not found among the six empirical networks analyzed in this paper. One explanation is 
that firms could be driven to form more closed ego networks by several potent forces. For example, 
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the formation of closed ego networks could correlate with geographic proximity, which could enable 
co-located firms to draw on the economic efficiencies and the institutional support mechanisms of 
an industry cluster (Krugman, 1991; Marquis, 2003). As another possibility, firms could be driven 
into dense communities by structural similarities or homophily (Powell et al., 2005). Finally, closed 
ego networks could also result from inertia and the comfort of familiarity, which could overshadow 
the economic imperatives of interorganizational collaboration (Li and Rowley, 2002).  
Intriguingly, the very same forces might also serve to align firms’ private goals with the 
shared goal of creating an overall network structure that best serves the entire collective. This 
conjecture is consistent with research in complexity science showing that many complex systems 
self-organize in distinct ways, and that this self-organization can help reduce the high costs of tie 
formation or make the system more robust to failure (Simon, 1962; Boisot and McKelvey, 2010). It 
is also relevant that self-organization may be adaptive and may occur in response to pressures 
stemming from the environment. Based on this logic, firms might be increasingly adapting their 
collaborative behaviors to respond to the requirements of value creation that are present in their 
industry. For example, we see community networks in technologically dynamic industries where 
these networks are particularly valuable and are needed to facilitate knowledge transfer among firms. 
Although our theory and analyses focused on the particular requirement of knowledge transfer, 
future research could extend this logic to a wider range of systems and other possible outcomes. In 
some systems, for example, environmental adaptation could reflect the need to minimize the costs of 
tie formation or to avoid network failure (Jackson and Wolinski, 1996; Schrank and Whitford, 2011).  
 Our paper offers several contributions to studies of social systems. First, we advance studies 
in the social embeddedness domain (Baker, 1984; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996) by exploring the 
relationship between the micro-processes of tie formation by individual actors and the emergent 
macro-structures of social systems. Our primary insight is that the variation in actors’ collaborative 
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behaviors across different social and economic contexts helps explain the emergent differences in 
macro-level networks, and we find that these differences are stable over time. Our work thus extends 
research on network variation that focused on a single social context (Rosenkopf and Padula, 2008; 
Zaheer and Soda, 2009; Gulati et al., 2012). In relation to this work, we show that networks may 
show different global features not just over time but also across different socio-economic contexts. 
Importantly, we relate these differences to the varying behavioral tendencies of actors, such as the 
pursuit of open or closed ego networks, and demonstrate their link to different industrial settings, 
their varying levels of technological dynamism, and the associated demands of value creation. 
Second, the typology of network structures developed in this paper offers fruitful 
opportunities for a comprehensive analysis of a wider range of systems. Our typology provides 
conceptual and analytical guidance with respect to the link between the differences in actors’ 
collaborative behaviors and the salient transitions between different industry-wide networks. These 
transitions characterize the emergence of distinct archetypes of clan, community, and convention networks, 
which feature pronounced differences in network connectedness and community structure and seem 
to exert profound effects on actors' collective outcomes. It is important to note that the scope of our 
argument is conditioned by generally low network density that characterizes many interorganizational 
settings. Yet, because sparse networks occur in other settings as well (Podolny and Baron, 1997), we 
believe that our typology has the potential for applicability to a wider range of empirical contexts.  
In particular, the typology of clan, community, and convention networks allows for a more precise 
classification of network forms in comparison with alternative typologies that use other network-
analytic concepts, such as betweenness centralization, closeness centralization, degree centralization, 
or the small-world quotient (e.g., Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). First, our typology is applicable to a broader 
range of network structures, including highly fragmented structures as well, for which many of these 
alternative typologies are undefined. Because the emergent clan, community, and convention networks are 
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differentiated in part by their degree of network connectedness, using our typology allows scholars to 
assess precisely how network systems differ structurally, as well as how they shape actors’ outcomes. 
The additional analyses we conducted showed that none of the alternative typologies could capture 
the emergent differences in interorganizational networks as precisely as the combination of network 
connectedness and community structure. As applied to our present analyses, the centralization-based 
metrics produced only two crude network forms while the small-world quotient turned out to be 
higher for conventions than for clans. Unsurprisingly, we also found that the typology of clan, community, 
and convention networks significantly outperforms alternative typologies in terms of explaining global 
diffusion outcomes (by a factor of 1.8 to 8.8 depending on which alternative typology was used).  
Third, the results of this paper also contribute to the ongoing debate about the varying 
implications of social structures in different environments (Rowley et al., 2000; Xiao and Tsui, 2007). 
More specifically, our results establish a connection between the collaborative behaviors of firms and 
the technological dynamism of their industry, which is essential for understanding the antecedents of 
network variation. This connection helps reconcile some of the conflicting findings regarding how 
social networks emerge and how they affect actors’ outcomes (Kilduff and Brass, 2010). For 
example, the present study sheds more light on why closed ego networks prevail in technologically 
stable contexts, such as the automotive industry or new materials (Gulati, 1995), but not in dynamic 
contexts such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals (Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014b). The present 
paper also helps clarify why chemical companies have been found to benefit more from closed ego 
networks (Ahuja, 2000), and why companies in the media sector (Zaheer and Soda, 2009) and the 
semiconductor industry (Rowley et al., 2000) have been found to gain greater advantages from open 
ego networks. Although our goal has not been to examine how a firm’s network position affects its 
performance, the present findings suggest that one way for research to explore this link would be to 
account for the baseline differences in value creation regimes across different industrial settings.
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Stability of the Emergent Industry-wide Networks  
We examine the stability condition at t = 100 time steps for a large network with N firms and a small 
number of K components (K << N). Network connectedness is inversely proportional to K, such 
that C = 1/K. We also assume that every component has the same size n, such that n = N/K, and 
that every firm has the same network constraint, such that average constraint across all firms is equal 
to the constraint of any given firm. For this condition to hold, we assume that the components are 
characterized by the maximum density of network ties.  
 Given these simplifying assumptions, it is straightforward to show that any changes in 
network connectedness will be related to the changes in firms’ ego network constraint, provided that 
network size is fixed (which is true in our model). First, we derive firms’ average constraint (ci) as:  
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By substituting n = N/K and rearranging the terms, we obtain: 
      
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Because K << N, 1 + K/(N-K) → 1. By substituting, we can simplify Equation (2) to:  
  i
Kc
N K
 (3) 
By solving the above for K, we get: 
  1
i
i
cK N
c
 (4) 
Equation (4) captures the relationship between the total number of network components (K) and the 
constraint of any given firm (ci). To derive the association between network connectedness (C) and 
constraint, we substitute K = 1/C and solve for C: 
 
    
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i
C
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 (5) 
This suggests that network connectedness decreases proportionally to firms’ constraint (0 § ci § 1). 
The precise rate at which connectedness decreases is given by the derivative of C with respect to ci: 
 2
1
i i
dC
dc Nc
   (6) 
Expression (6) captures the relationship between the stability of network connectedness (dC/dci) and 
the stability of firms’ ego networks. It suggests that once firms obtain their optimal constraint levels 
such that no further improvements are possible, then (ceteris paribus) the connectedness of the entire 
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network should stabilize as well.19 To understand when this happens, we explored how long it takes 
for a typical firm to obtain an optimal constraint level. To this end, we assumed that each firm must 
replace all of its initial ties assigned to it at t = 0. Because the likelihood of forming a new tie is 0.15 
at any time and a typical firm is initially assigned 4 unique ties, replacing these ties with new ones will 
roughly take 4/0.15 ≈ 27 time steps. The most critical changes in the firm's ego network should thus 
occur approximately over the first 20-30 time steps of the simulation. 
 We validated these analytic conclusions with our model (see Figure 8). Figure 8a plots firms’ 
average constraint levels in a typical clan (fracp=0 = 0.9, p = 0.1), a typical community (fracp=0 = 0.7, p = 
0.3), and a typical convention network (fracp=0 = 0.2, p = 0.8) over time. Figures 8b and Figure 8c, in 
turn, plot the related changes in network connectedness and community structure at the system level.  
Results confirm the analytically derived relationship between stable constraint levels and stable global 
network properties, both of which emerge just over the first 20 to 30 time steps of the simulation.  
----------------------------- 
Figure 8 about here 
----------------------------- 
Appendix 2: Robustness Analyses 
We conducted additional tests to determine if our results are robust to alternative parameters or 
model specifications. First, we tested some alternative values of network size and density. In the 
main analysis, we used values that were supplied by our own data and were also consistent with prior 
research on interorganizational networks (Rosenkopf and Schilling, 2007). In additional tests, we 
extended our modeling to a broader range of network sizes (N = 2,000; N = 20,000) and densities  
(2 § k § 6). The results were similar to those reported in the paper. The only difference was when 
we applied extremely low density (k = 2). Under these conditions, the emergent network was too 
sparse to obtain high connectedness at any level of p. This suggests that our findings could be less 
applicable to extremely sparse systems that preclude the formation of a large main component 
(Callaway, Newman, Strogatz, and Watts, 2000). Although such extremely sparse networks are rare in 
the interorganizational setting, some studies have identified the occurrence of sparse networks in 
certain industries, such as the footwear industry or paper mills (Rosenkopf and Schilling, 2007).  
Second, we varied the starting conditions of the simulation. We specifically extended the set 
of initial networks to two other stylized networks: (a) the regular network in which every firm is 
connected to four other firms, and (b) the small-world network in which most firms are connected 
to four other firms but 10% of the firms are connected at random (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). 
Furthermore, in addition to the Erdös-Rényi random network used in the paper, we also tested four 
alternative random networks with variable degree distributions. These included: (a) a normal degree 
distribution with a mean of 4 and a standard deviation of 4, (b) a log-normal distribution with a mean 
of 4 and a standard deviation of 4, (c) an exponential distribution with l = 2.5, and (d) a power-law 
distribution with g = 2.5. All these models produced similar results to those reported in the paper.20 
                                                 
19 Equation (3) leads to similar conclusions with respect to the relationship between firms’ average network constraint 
and the network’s community structure. Consider a simple network with K interconnected network communities (rather 
than K components), where community structure Q increases proportionally to K. Following the same reasoning as in 
the appendix, we can express the stability of community structure as a function of ci, namely    2( ) /(1 )i iQ c N c . 
20 In addition to reaffirming the robustness of our main model, changing the initial degree distribution also allowed us to 
validate our assumptions with respect to the costs of interorganizational ties. Our theory postulated that one reason firms 
might choose between open and closed ego networks relates to the benefits and costs of these distinct positions, which 
might vary across industries. Yet, interorganizational partnerships could also involve other types of costs, such as the 
costs of managing and coordinating across different collaborations. By considering other degree distributions, one can 
account for these various types of costs indirectly. For example, a normal degree distribution implies that firms could 
realize certain benefits and synergies from multiple ties; however, only provided that their number does not exceed the 
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Third, we considered a model with greater behavioral heterogeneity of firms in the industry. 
Our main model assumed that firms in a given industry would choose between open and closed ego 
networks with a certain probability p, equal for all firms. This specification offered the best fit to the 
data. In alternative specifications, we assumed that p is not fixed but varies randomly across firms. 
We considered five different specifications of this model using a normal distribution of p with a 
fixed mean between 0 and 1 and a standard deviation varied from 0.1 to 0.5 (in 0.1 increments). 
Introducing this additional behavioral heterogeneity to the model did not affect our results. 
Fourth, we revisited our assumptions regarding firms’ visibility across the wider network. The 
assumption we made in the main analysis was that the extent to which an ego can observe potential 
alters is inversely proportional to network distance. One possibility to extend this model is to restrict 
ego’s visibility to a certain maximum range, beyond which no alter can be “seen.” To implement a 
limited range of visibility, we specified an alternative model in which the ego can observe only those 
alters who are up to dmax links away from the ego. We tested values from dmax = 2, which corresponds 
to the shortest distance between any two unconnected firms, to dmax = 10, which corresponds to the 
longest distance measured for any two firms in our dataset. The results remained unchanged. 
Fifth, we considered two alternative models of tie formation between firms that deviate from 
the satisficing model implemented in the paper. These included: (a) a model in which both firms do 
not maximize their benefits but merely strive for a change that reflects their individual preferences in 
terms of obtaining higher or lower constraint, and (b) a model in which both firms strive to obtain 
the maximum change in constraint. The results of the first model were similar to our main results. 
The second model, in turn, showed the same pattern of covariance between network connectedness 
and community structure, but with absolute values of both properties substantially lower than those 
observed in the data. Such a poor fit was evident particularly in the case of the automotive industry, 
chemicals, and new materials, where firms were found to pursue more closed ego networks. For this 
set of industries, we found that the maximizing model on average underestimates the observed levels 
of network connectedness by about 75%, and of community structure by about 60%. 
Sixth, we considered an alternative mechanism by which firms can dissolve their existing ties. 
To reflect the contractual nature of interorganizational partnerships, in the main analysis we assumed 
that partnership duration is a function of time. In the alternative model we tested whether in addition 
to the passage of time, tie dissolution can also be driven by firms’ desire to create a more open or a 
more closed ego network. We found that such a model yields substantially poorer fit to the data over 
low to medium p values, producing networks with substantially lower levels of connectedness (on 
average 50% below the main results), and weaker community structures (on average 80% below the 
main results). As a result, we were unable to validate this model against our six empirical networks. 
Seventh, rather than measuring network connectedness through the variation in component 
sizes, we specified connectedness as the fraction of dyads that are accessible to one another via an 
existing network path of some length. This alternative measure strongly correlated with the original 
measure of connectedness used in the paper (at over 0.8), and the main results remained unchanged.  
Finally, we verified our model against two other models of network formation established by 
prior research: (a) a model in which firms select between entirely new alters and the alters they know 
through previous ties (e.g., Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips, 2004; Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, and 
Chuang, 2005), and (b) a model in which firms follow the strategy of preferential attachment by 
favoring highly central actors (e.g., Barabási and Albert, 1999; Powell et al., 2005). We first checked 
whether these models are supported empirically. We found that our data provide some support for 
the first model but not the second one, offering no evidence of preferential attachment among firms. 
                                                                                                                                                              
mean value of four. Beyond this threshold level, the partnership costs would start to rise and would eventually exceed the 
benefits. The power-law distribution, in turn, implies an exponential increase in partnership costs. Such an increase could 
eventually outweigh any benefits and synergies that firms could realize from having multiple ongoing ties. 
 39
This insight is consistent with recent work on the dynamics of interorganizational networks, which 
showed that firms are unlikely to be unconditionally attracted to central partners (Powell et al., 2005; 
Gulati et al., 2012). We then checked the validity of the first model, which distinguishes between new 
and familiar partners and found that it underestimates the empirical levels of network connectedness 
by about 60%, and community structure by about 65%. This suggests that when compared to other 
agent-based models of network emergence, the model proposed in this paper provides a realistic 
account of firms’ collaborative behaviors with broad relevance across different empirical contexts.
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Tables & Figures 
     
Table 1. The fraction of firms with zero propensity for open ego networks (fracp=0), average propensity of the remaining 
firms to create open networks (p), and the average industry-level R&D intensity (RDI) over 1987–1999. 
Industry fracp=0 p RDI Industry fracp=0 p RDI 
Automotive 0.808 0.343 0.039 Microelectronics 0.760 0.433 0.050 
Biotech & pharma 0.630 0.406 0.075 New materials 0.832 0.247 0.031 
Chemicals 0.787 0.314 0.038 Telecom 0.764 0.352 0.048 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations. 
 Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
DV Constraint Change 0.169 0.235          
1 Sales (log) 7.779 3.079 1.000         
2 ROA -0.014 0.274 0.473 1.000        
3 Firm-level RDI (log) 0.257 0.509 -0.699 -0.566 1.000       
4 Network Constraint 0.480 0.348 -0.275 -0.082 0.128 1.000      
5 Network Size 328.658 148.865 -0.371 -0.204 0.359 -0.022 1.000     
6 Network Avg. Degree 3.973 0.646 0.153 0.089 -0.183 -0.210 -0.368 1.000    
7 Industry Concentration 0.201 0.155 -0.031 0.014 0.008 -0.039 0.195 -0.098 1.000   
8 Industry-level RDI 0.054 0.020 -0.443 -0.216 0.462 -0.033 0.642 -0.166 0.038 1.000  
9 Industry Maturity 0.030 0.019 -0.052 -0.024 0.066 0.093 -0.063 -0.251 0.473 0.058 1.000 
 
 
Table 3. Three-level mixed-effects regression with random intercepts (DV: Firm-level Constraint Change from year t to 
t+1; SE's in parentheses; ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10). 
 Model 
Constant -0.136** 
 (0.061)  
Sales (log) 0.001    
 (0.002)  
ROA 0.017    
 (0.017)  
Firm-level RDI (log) 0.009    
 (0.012)  
Network Constraint 0.550*** 
 (0.012)  
Network Size -0.000   
 (0.000)  
Network Avg. Degree 0.002    
 (0.011)  
Industry Concentration 0.030    
 (0.039)  
Year Fixed Effects Included 
Industry-level RDI 1.769*** 
 (0.585)  
Industry Maturity 0.733    
 (2.113)  
Observations 1,253 
Log-likelihood 654.6 
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Table 4. Network size (N), average degree (k), network density (D), network connectedness (C), and community 
structure (Q), averaged over 1987-1999. 
Industry N k D C Q Industry N k D C Q 
Automotive 179 3.24 0.02 0.21 0.64 Microelectronics 212 4.39 0.02 0.51 0.59 
Biotech & pharma 386 4.13 0.01 0.44 0.76 New materials 336 4.00 0.01 0.09 0.73 
Chemicals 311 4.07 0.01 0.20 0.73 Telecom 291 4.03 0.01 0.48 0.67 
 
 
Table 5. Analysis of the results on network connectedness [E(C)] and community structure [E(Q)] produced by the 
model with respect to the empirical values (Table 4). Model fit is evaluated using two z-scores: one for network 
connectedness (zC) and the other for community structure (zQ). Insignificant z-scores indicate good fit. 
Industry E(C) E(Q) zC zQ Industry E(C) E(Q) zC zQ 
Automotive 0.20 0.63 -0.19† 0.09† Microelectronics 0.51 0.60 -0.05† -0.24† 
Biotech & pharma 0.46 0.75 -0.24† 0.42† New materials 0.11 0.71 0.07† -0.65† 
Chemicals 0.22 0.69 0.21† -0.38† Telecom 0.47 0.69 -0.01† 0.48† 
†Difference insignificant at any standard level (two-tailed test). 
 
 
Table 6. Tukey-Kramer tests of pairwise deviance between network connectedness and community structure. 
Network property Test t-score 
Network connectedness Clans vs. communities -355.62*** 
 Clans vs. conventions -904.60*** 
 Communities vs. conventions -432.03*** 
Community structure  Clans vs. communities -135.07*** 
 Clans vs. conventions -70.09*** 
 Communities vs. conventions 70.94*** 
                   *** Difference significant at p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Estimation of a firm's propensity to pursue a more open ego network. 
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Fig. 2. Network connectedness and community structure. Fig. 3. Simple stylized model of network emergence. 
(a) low connectedness 
 
(b) high connectedness 
 
 
(c) weak communities 
 
(d) strong communities 
 
 
0.59
0.66
0.48
0.46
0.48
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Network connectedness and community structure produced by the simulation model at t = 100 time steps. 
(a) network connectedness (b) community structure  
  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Smooth Bézier curves capturing the critical transitions in network connectedness and community structure. The 
curves represent three distinct scenarios with low fracp=0 = 0, medium fracp=0 = 0.35, and high fracp=0 = 0.70, respectively. 
(a) network connectedness (b) community structure                        
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Fig. 6. Typical structure of a (a) clan network, (b) community network, and (c) convention network. Figure 6d 
summarizes the overall typology with respect to fracp=0 and p.  
(a) clan network     (b) community network        (c) convention network            (d) overall network typology 
 
Clans
Communities
Conventions
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Two representative images of a clan network and a community network obtained from the dataset. 
(a) new materials network in 1994 (clan network)                     (b) telecommunications network in 1994 (community network) 
  
 
 
Fig. 8. Relationship between the stability of firms' ego networks (a) and the emergent global network properties (b-c). 
(a) stability of network constraint           (b) stability of connectedness                 (c) stability of community structure 
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